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INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief is filed in support of PacifiCorp's appeal of (1) the Commission's 
erroneous decision to toll the five-year limitations period applicable to escaped property 
assessments and (2) the Commission's erroneous ruling that PacifiCorp could not obtain a 
refund of excess property taxes paid even though PacifiCorp demonstrated that it paid 
property taxes on value in excess of the fair market value of its property.1 
PacifiCorp does not materially disagree with the Commission's Statement of Facts. 
However, there are two misrepresentations contained in the Commission's "Statement of 
the Case." One is the Commission's claim that PacifiCorp's Suggestion of Mootness 
deprived the Counties of a forum to determine whether the escaped property assessment 
should issue. Commission's Brief, p. 6. The other is the Commission's characterization 
of the escaped property assessment as an assessment of property omitted from the original 
assessment. IdL at 4. Both of those allegations are wrong and are addressed below in 
Sections I and II respectively. 
1
 The last portion of this Reply Brief, Section III, contains PacifiCorp's response 
to the Counties' belated attempt to appeal the Commission's ruling that the statute of 
limitations had already expired before the Division issued the escaped property 
assessment. PacifiCorp believes no response is necessary because the Counties should 
not be permitted to raise an issue in its reply which it failed to address in its opening brief. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). 
1 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF 
EQUITABLE TOLLING TO SUSPEND THE EXPIRED LIMITATIONS 
PERIOD THEREBY FORCING PACIFICORP TO SUBMIT TO AN 
UNTIMELY ASSESSMENT. 
On April 4, 2002, the Commission ordered the Division to issue the escaped 
property assessment. As the assessing authority, the Division bore the responsibility to 
make sure the assessment complied with all statutory requirements including any 
applicable deadline. Unfortunately, the Division delayed its issuance of the escaped 
property assessment until the limitations period had already expired because it "got busy 
doing other things." Transcript, p. 62. Neither the Division, the Counties, nor the 
Commission have ever alleged that PacifiCorp interfered with the Division's ability to 
issue a timely escaped property assessment. Id, 
Despite the fact that the Division was solely responsible for the delay, the 
Commission forced PacifiCorp to submit to the untimely assessment and to engage in 
protracted litigation because of the potential loss of revenue to the Counties. The 
potential loss of revenue is the direct result of the Division's failure to act in a timely 
manner. Nevertheless, the Division has never accepted responsibility for that delay and, 
along with the Commission and the Counties, has continued to blame PacifiCorp for the 
Counties' dilemma. This has been a costly endeavor for PacifiCorp and PacifiCorp is 
confident that this Court will not be deceived by the Commission's and the Counties' 
continuing attempts to deflect attention away from the Division's culpability by focusing 
2 
on the alleged innocence of the Counties. Utah law has never recognized a court's right 
to toll a limitations period simply to ensure that an aggrieved litigant is made whole. 
A. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply When a Litigant was Fully Aware of 
the Facts Before the Limitations Period has Expired, 
PacifiCorp has provided extensive legal support for the proposition that equitable 
tolling cannot occur when a claimant is aware of its claim before the limitations period 
has expired. See PacifiCorp's Brief of Cross-Petitioner and Respondent pp. 13-19. The 
fact remains that both the Division and the Counties were aware of the reporting error 
before the expiration of the limitations period. Under Utah law, this fact precludes the 
application of equitable tolling.2 
This threshold requirement has been virtually ignored by the Counties and the 
Commission. The Commission disregards long-standing precedent and argues that Estes 
v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, 979 P.2d 823 abrogated this requirement. That was not the holding 
of the Estes court. 
In Estes, a former prison inmate asked the court to toll the one year limitations 
period applicable to four habeas corpus petitions. Estes claimed that his lack of access to 
a lawyer or law library while incarcerated were exceptional circumstances justifying 
2
 The Counties devote a section of their Reply Brief to their characterization of the 
limitations period as a "look back" period rather than a statute of limitations. Counties' 
Reply Brief, pp. 12-13. Regardless of whether the five year time period is a "look back" 
period or a traditional statute of limitations, there is no basis for equitable tolling where 
the claimant is fully aware of the facts and exceptional circumstances do not exist. 
3 
tolling. He also claimed that the hardship he would suffer would be great because he 
would lose his cause of action. Estes argued that the judges would not suffer hardship 
because all relevant evidence was already contained in various court records. The court 
made the following observation: 
Without more, this is not a persuasive application of the balancing test. 
Many claimants lose the opportunity to pursue a cause of action when a 
statute of limitations is applied to their individual cases; the fact that all 
required evidence is already in the record does not serve to tilt the balance 
any further towards a claimant's position. 
Id. at 825. In addition, the court observed that "Every case in which we have addressed a 
'special circumstances exception' has dealt with tolling a statute of limitations through 
application of the discovery rule." Id at 825 (emphasis added). Although the court 
addressed the special circumstances test despite the fact that Mr. Estes conceded he had 
discovered his claim prior to the expiration of the limitations period, it did not hold nor 
did it suggest that this examination was an abandonment of the discovery requirement. 
There is simply no precedent for tolling the limitations period when the parties 
involved knew of the claim and simply let the limitations period expire. However, even if 
the court were to apply the balancing test referred to in Estes, it would still find that there 
are no exceptional circumstances in this case which justify tolling. Furthermore, tolling 
under the facts of this case would, as the Estes court warned, "potentially cause greater 
hardships than it would ultimately relieve." Id. at 825. 
4 
B. Exceptional Circumstances Justifying Tolling Cannot be Found Where 
the Alleged Harm to the Counties is the Result of the Division's 
Inaction. 
Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy reserved for cases in which there are 
"exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule would be irrational5 
or 'unjust.'" Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 626 (Utah 1995)(citing Warren v. 
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)); see also Estes, 979 P.2d at 824. 
The Commission claims there are extraordinary circumstances in this case in part because 
the Counties diligently sought the escaped property assessment prior to the expiration of 
the limitations period. As the Commission explained, the Counties' actions "included 
bringing an administrative action that resulted in an order of the Commission to its 
Division to 'issue an escaped property tax assessment.5" Commission's Brief, p. 18. In 
other words, the Counties9 actions were successful! As a result of the Commission's 
decision, the Division was charged with the duty to issue an escaped property assessment 
which would comply with all applicable statutory requirements. 
Unfortunately, the Division did not act until August because it had more pressing 
matters to deal with. Transcript, p. 62. By that time the limitations period for the 
reassessment of the 1997 value of PacifiCorp's property had already expired.3 The 
3
 However, the limitations period had not expired for reassessment of the 1998 
value of PacifiCorp's property. An escaped property assessment for that year was also 
issued on August 29, 2002, and is not barred by the limitations period. Thus, the 
Division's neglect did not totally deprive the Counties of the relief they had sought. 
5 
alleged harm to the Counties is the direct result of the Division's failure to comply with 
statutory requirements in its issuance of the escaped property assessment. PacifiCorp was 
not responsible for the Division's delay and should never have been deprived of the 
protection of the statute of limitations without evidence of a causal connection between 
PacifiCorp and the Division's conduct. Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155 
(UtahCt.App. 1994).4 
In Dansie, the plaintiff sued a contractor and developer for injuries sustained in 
December of 1985 when a bracket securing a handrail broke. The defendants were 
dilatory in responding to interrogatories attempting to discover the identities of the seller 
and manufacturer of the faulty bracket. After the limitations period had expired, Dansie 
discovered the identity of the seller (Anderson) and the manufacturer (Belwith) and filed 
an amended complaint naming them as defendants. Anderson and Belwith filed motions 
to dismiss on the basis that the complaint was barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations. Dansie claimed that Anderson and Belwith should be estopped from relying 
on the four year limitations period because they would be unjustly benefitting from the 
4
 The Commission's decision to force PacifiCorp to submit to the illegal 
assessment is akin to a judge tolling the statute of limitations in a tort action because the 
plaintiffs attorney neglected to file the complaint on time despite the urging of his client. 
No competent court would force a party to defend an untimely claim simply because the 
attorney overlooked the statute of limitations. Instead, the would-be plaintiff would have 
a claim against his attorney for malpractice. Similarly, the Counties' claim, if any, is 
against the Division for failing to comply with the Commission's order in a timely 
manner. 
6 
original defendants' "unconscionable delays in complying with discovery requests." Id. 
at 1159. The court rejected this argument because Anderson and Belwith were not 
responsible for the conduct of the original defendants and "should not be deprived of the 
protections of the statute of limitations because of the actions of unrelated third parties." 
Id at 1160. 
Like Anderson and Belwith, PacifiCorp was not responsible for the Division's 
conduct and "should not be deprived of the protections of the statute of limitations 
because of the actions of [the Division]." Id Nevertheless, the Commission has allowed 
the Division to escape responsibility for its failure to carry out the Commission's directive 
in a timely manner and has forced PacifiCorp to submit to an untimely assessment even 
though the Division's conduct was completely outside of PacifiCorp's control. 
PacifiCorp is as blameless in this matter as the Counties and the extraordinary remedy of 
tolling should not be used to deprive PacifiCorp of the statute of limitations defense. 
C. PacifiCorp's Filing of the Suggestion of Mootness is Not an 
Extraordinary Circumstance Justifying Tolling of the Limitations 
Period. 
The Commission relies heavily on PacifiCorp's filing of the Suggestion of 
Mootness as a basis for its finding of exceptional circumstances. Unfortunately, the filing 
of this motion has become a sticking point for the Division, the Counties, and the 
Commission. All three have persisted in their characterization of PacifiCorp as an 
underhanded litigant because it filed the Suggestion of Mootness "while the [Division] 
7 
was still considering issuing the escaped property assessment." R. 519 (March 5, 2003 
Order, p. 6). In addition, the Commission vilifies PacifiCorp for allegedly using the 
Suggestion of Mootness "to cut-off the administrative remedy that formed the basis of its 
own motion to the Supreme Court." Commission's Brief, p. 19.5 
The misplaced focus on the Suggestion of Mootness ignores the fact that the 
Division's right to issue the escaped property assessment had already expired by the time 
PacifiCorp filed the Suggestion of Mootness. Once the Commission ordered the Division 
to issue the escaped property assessment, the Division bore the responsibility for 
providing the relief to the Counties by complying with the procedural requirements of the 
taxing statutes. The Division's failure to comply with those procedural requirements 
rendered the assessment untimely and unenforceable. 
The Commission also claims that dismissal of the Counties' appeal "unfairly [left] 
the Counties without a forum on whether that [escaped property] assessment should 
5
 It is unfortunate and disappointing that the Commission uses its 
mischaracterization of the sequence of events to portray PacifiCorp as a cunning and 
manipulative litigant. The continued focus on PacifiCorp's legitimate, legally sound, and 
ultimately successful Suggestion of Mootness is a red herring. The alleged harm to the 
Counties is a direct result of the Division's unfortunate failure to comply with the statute 
of limitations in its issuance of the escaped property assessment. The Counties, likewise, 
continue to disparage PacifiCorp by claiming that it "desires to get away with its 
misreporting" and by suggesting that it intentionally "deceived the Property Tax Division 
into making an erroneous assessment, by providing incomplete or erroneous information." 
Counties' Reply Brief, p. 17, n. 2 and p. 19. There is no evidence to support these 
allegations and PacifiCorp's alleged motives are not at issue before the Court. It is 
PacifiCorp's sincere hope that the parties will be able to focus on the real issues and 
refrain from their mischaracterization's of PacifiCorp's actions and/or motives. 
8 
issue." Counties Brief, p. 6. Ironically, the Commission had already provided that forum 
in its prior proceeding where it ordered the Division to investigate and issue an escaped 
property assessment. Counties Brief, Appendix 2 (April 4, 2002 Order). The whole point 
of the Suggestion of Mootness was that the Counties were not entitled to a second forum. 
Having provided the "forum on whether that [escaped property] assessment should issue," 
the Commission cannot seriously contend that the Counties were deprived of access to an 
administrative remedy. 
Finally, the Commission misrepresents the sequence of events surrounding 
PacifiCorp's filing of the Suggestion of Mootness. It erroneously claims that the Division 
issued the escaped property assessment "before" PacifiCorp filed the Suggestion of 
Mootness and that the grounds for that motion were that "the Division had now issued the 
Escaped Property Assessment." Commission's Brief, p. 15 (emphasis added). In fact, 
PacifiCorp filed the Suggestion of Mootness on August 23 and the Division issued the 
escaped property assessment on August 29, 2002. The basis for PacifiCorp's motion was 
simply that the relief sought by the Counties had already been obtained in the form of the 
April 4, 2002 Order. 
The Commission agreed that the Counties' appeal was moot and joined 
PacifiCorp's Suggestion of Mootness. It appears, however, that the Commission's 
decision to join the Suggestion of Mootness may have been based on the fact that the 
escaped property assessment had been issued. PacifiCorp maintains that the Division's 
9 
issuance of the escaped property assessment was not material to the Suggestion of 
Mootness. The Commission had done everything within its scope of authority when it 
ordered the Division to issue the assessment. Even if the Division had complied with the 
Commission's order in a timely manner or if the limitations period had been six years 
instead of five, PacifiCorp still would have filed the Suggestion of Mootness because the 
relief sought by the Counties had already been obtained by virtue of the Commission's 
April 4, 2002 Order.6 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with PacifiCorp and held that the Counties had 
already received the relief they requested from the Commission. There is no reason to 
assume that the Utah Supreme Court would have denied the Suggestion of Mootness if it 
had realized that the escaped property assessment was untimely. The Commission's and 
Counties' continued focus on the Suggestion of Mootness is an inappropriate, collateral 
attack on the Utah Supreme Court's decision. The Suggestion of Mootness did not 
preclude the Division from acting in a timely manner and thus does not constitute an 
"extraordinary circumstance" sufficient to toll the limitations period. The Suggestion of 
Mootness did not resurrect the Division's right to issue the escaped property assessment 
nor did it constitute a waiver by PacifiCorp of its right to challenge the escaped property 
6
 This is demonstrated by the fact that the April 4, 2002 Order directing the 
Division to issue the requested assessments also resulted in an escaped property 
assessment for 1998. This assessment was not derailed or invalidated by PacifiCorp's 
Suggestion of Mootness because in issuing the 1998 assessment, the Division complied 
with statutory requirements and issued a timely escaped property assessment. 
10 
assessment as untimely.7 Accordingly, the position taken by PacifiCorp (and the 
Commission) in the 2002 appeal provides no basis for the application of equitable tolling. 
D. Application of Tolling to the Facts of this Case Resulted in Hardship to 
Pacificorp and Opens the Floodgates to Untimely Pursuit of Legal 
Claims Against All Utah Property Owners. 
The Utah Supreme Court has warned against liberal tolling of limitations periods 
observing that "liberal tolling could potentially cause greater hardships than it would 
ultimately relieve." Estes, 979 P.2d at 825. This case aptly demonstrates the potential for 
hardship. Because the Commission denied PacifiCorp's motion to dismiss, PacifiCorp 
has, so far, been forced to continue to litigate this matter for an additional two years. 
PacifiCorp has expended tens of thousands of dollars to respond to numerous motions in 
addition to the expense of a week-long trial and subsequent appeal. To make matters 
worse, the Commission ruled that, even though PacifiCorp proved its fair market value 
was less than the original assessment, it had no right to a refund of the excessive property 
taxes. 
7
 When PacifiCorp filed the Suggestion of Mootness, it did not take any position 
on the viability of an escaped property assessment and, accordingly, could not be 
presumed to have waived a limitations period. In the first place, the Division had not yet 
issued the escaped property assessment. More importantly, however, it would have been 
inappropriate for PacifiCorp or any other party to take a position regarding the viability of 
the escaped property assessment because that was not the issue before the Utah Supreme 
Court. The only issue was whether the Counties had received the relief they had 
requested. 
11 
However, perhaps the greatest hardship that results from the Commission's 
decision is the ongoing threat to all Utah property owners who will no longer have the 
assurance that they will not be subject to escaped property assessments after five years. 
County Bd. of Equal v. Salt Lake County. 789 P.2d 290 (Utah 1990) (citing State v. 
Mortgage-Bond Co.. 224 Ala. 206, 409, 140 So. 365, 368 (1932))("The public good 
requires security of titles as well as just taxation and the law aims at both.")- If the 
Commission's decision is affirmed, then when an entity which receives property tax 
dollars (such as the Counties) believes property has escaped taxation and "takes 
affirmative steps toward having the escaped property assessment issued . . . within the 
five year limitations period," the Division or any other taxing authority will have the 
luxury of delaying any action on that request beyond the five year limitations period with 
the assurance that the assessment will be enforced because the "prejudice is great" to the 
recipient of the tax dollars and "the matter is out of their control." R. 520 (March 5, 2003 
Order, p. 7). This is ironic in light of the Commission's finding that the Counties did not 
even have standing to demand that the Division issue the assessment. Yet, by virtue of 
the April 4, 2002 Order, the Commission has elevated the interest of the Counties above 
the interest a taxpayer has in a timely assessment such that the Counties and the Division 
can now force a taxpayer to submit to an assessment which does not even comply with the 
requirements of state law. 
12 
The Commission's decision to toll the limitations period was error and should be 
reversed. Reversal of that decision renders all remaining issues moot. 
II. PACIFICORP IS ENTITLED TO PROVE THE FAIR MARKET VALUE 
OF ITS PROPERTY AND OBTAIN A REFUND OF TAXES PAID ON THE 
ASSESSED VALUE WHICH EXCEEDS THE PROPERTY'S FAIR 
MARKET VALUE. 
PacifiCorp appealed the escaped property assessment and sought the opportunity to 
prove the fair market value of its property. The Commission ruled, however, that before 
it could allow PacifiCorp to prove the value of its property, the Commission was required 
to ascertain whether the original assessment had undervalued PacifiCorp's property. It 
held that, if the original assessment had not undervalued the property, there could be no 
refund because the original assessment was closed. This conclusion is based on the 
Commission's belief that the escaped property assessment is an assessment "in addition 
to" the original assessment. PacifiCorp fundamentally disagrees with that 
characterization and contends that when the Division issues an escaped property 
assessment for allegedly undervalued property, the original assessment is repudiated and 
the new assessment stands in its place. Any taxes paid on the original assessment are 
credited towards the replacement assessment and thus are subject to refund if the taxpayer 
proves that its value is less than the value on which it has already paid taxes. 
This is the only interpretation which is consistent with Utah law. First, it is 
consistent with the Utah definition of escaped property which provides for the complete 
reassessment of property which has allegedly been undervalued. Second, it eliminates the 
13 
need for the threshold inquiry created by the Commission. This is important because the 
"threshold inquiry" violates Utah law by reopening the original assessment. Third, it is 
the only interpretation which is consistent with proclamations by the Utah Supreme Court 
that when the issue of value is raised, "[t]he Commission was entitled to rule on precisely 
[that issue]." County Bd. of Equalization v. Tax Comm'n, ex rel. Schneiter Enterprises, 
Ltd.. 899 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah 1995). PacifiCorp's interpretation allows the 
Commission to perform its constitutional responsibility to determine the fair market value 
of property and to exercise its statutory authority to "increase, lower, or sustain the 
assessment." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007(7). Neither the Commission nor the Counties 
have refuted PacifiCorp's claim that the right to lower the assessment includes the right to 
refund taxes credited towards payment of the escaped property assessment. 
A. The Commission Erred When it Concluded that the Escaped Property 
Assessment Assessed Only a Portion of PacifiCorp's Taxable Property. 
The Commission's denial of PacifiCorp's refund request is based on its 
characterization of the escaped property assessment as valuing a "narrow classification of 
property" completely separate from the property assessed by the original assessment. 
Commission's Brief, p. 29. According to the Commission, "escaped property is not what 
was included in the original assessment of 'all property.' It is property that escaped 
taxation originally, but now is being assessed and taxed." Id.8 Because the Commission 
8
 In its Statement of the Case, the Commission claims that the escaped property 
assessment was issued "for property that PacifiCorp had not properly reported to the 
14 
believes the escaped property assessment is entirely separate from the original 
assessment, it concluded that there can be no refund of monies paid under the original 
assessment.9 
The Commission's position obfuscates the clear distinction created under Utah law 
between two separate categories of escaped property. The first category is "omitted 
property" which includes property "inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to 
the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority." Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-102(1 l)(a)(i) (2002). It also includes property which was "omitted 
Division in 1997" and that "the Division had discovered this property during a deposition 
for the 1999 assessment." Commission's Brief, p. 4 (emphasis added). These statements 
create the impression that specific items of property belonging to PacifiCorp had been 
omitted from the original assessment when, in fact, both assessments are for all of 
PacifiCorp's property. The escaped property assessment was issued, not because specific 
items of property had been omitted from the original assessment, but because the Division 
believed the original assessment had undervalued PacifiCorp's property. It is, perhaps, 
worth mentioning that the reporting errors which allegedly resulted in an undervaluation 
were errors contained in the Summary portion of the Property Tax Report. The correct 
information was accurately set forth in another portion of the Report, but was apparently 
overlooked by the Division. 
9
 This characterization is inconsistent with the Commission's claim that it must 
address a threshold question of whether the property had been "undervalued" by the 
original assessment. On the one hand the Commission claims that PacifiCorp's escaped 
property assessment is for property which "escaped taxation originally, but now is being 
assessed and taxed." Yet, on the other had, the Commission contends that it must 
perform a threshold inquiry to determine whether the original assessment undervalued 
PacifiCorp's escaped property. If, as the Commission claims, the "escaped property" was 
never included in the original assessment in the first place, then a threshold inquiry to 
determine whether that same property had been "undervalued" by the original assessment 
would be useless. Regardless of how the Commission decides to characterize the escaped 
property assessment, it should, at the very least, make sure that its arguments are 
internally consistent. 
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from the tax rolls because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting 
requirements." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(1 l)(a)(ii). An escaped property assessment 
of "omitted" properly is an assessment of property for which a prior, enforceable 
assessment does not exist. 
The second category of escaped property is "undervalued property." This includes 
property which is undervalued "because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply with the 
reporting requirements" or "because of errors made by the assessing authority based upon 
incomplete or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-102(1 l)(a)(ii) and (iii). Because such property is allegedly "undervalued" there 
must be, by definition, a prior assessment which assigned a "value" to such property. In 
the case of escaped property which has allegedly been "undervalued," the assessing 
authority issues a entirely new assessment for that property. County Bd. of Equal, of Salt 
Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d 291, 294 (Utah 1990)(property previously 
listed on tax assessment notice could not be omitted property, but could only qualify as 
underassessed property). 
Because PacifiCorp's property was allegedly "undervalued" rather than omitted, 
the escaped property assessment was, unquestionably, assessing property for which there 
had already been a prior assessment. The escaped property assessment, on its face, 
purports to ascertain the value of all of PacifiCorp's property. In that assessment, the 
Division acknowledged that "[t]he original assessment had a system value of $7.68 
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billion" and then recalculates that value to arrive at a "Reconciled System Value" of 
$7.92 billion. This was not an assessment for $7.92 billion in addition to the original 
system value of $7.68 billion. Despite its recent allegations to the contrary, even the 
Commission has acknowledged that the reassessment was for all of PacifiCorp's property. 
For example, in the Final Order, the Commission observed, "[t]he Escaped Property 
Assessment is a new, higher final value conclusion which Petitioner is entitled to 
challenge." R. 40 (emphasis added) (Final Order, p. 12). Furthermore, the Commission's 
creation of the "threshold inquiry" into whether the escaped property was undervalued by 
the original assessment presumes that the escaped property had been assessed by the 
original assessment. 
B. The Commission Erred When It Interpreted the Escaped Property 
Statute to Require a Threshold Inquiry Into Whether PacifiCorp's 
Property had been Undervalued by the Original Assessment. 
The Commission claims that the escaped property assessment was an assessment 
of property which had not been assessed by the original assessment. Yet the Commission 
did not limit its review to the new, allegedly separate, escaped property assessment. 
Instead, the Commission concluded that the issuance of the escaped property assessment 
required it to review the original assessment and conduct a threshold inquiry into whether 
that assessment had undervalued the property. This is problematic for several reasons. 
First, if the Commission truly believed that the property assessed by the escaped property 
assessment "escaped taxation originally," then, because no prior assessment for that 
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property would exist, there could be no threshold inquiry into whether the property at 
issue had been "undervalued" by the original assessment. This inconsistency should not 
be ignored. 
Second, the threshold inquiry advocated by the Commission ignores the fact that 
any inquiry into whether the original assessment reflected the fair market value of 
PacifiCorp's property is barred by the statute of limitations. Under Utah law a taxpayer 
has a limited period of time within which to appeal an assessment. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-2-1004 to 1006. If the taxpayer does not appeal, then the assessed value becomes 
binding on both the taxpayer, the assessing authority, and any other interested party. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-1007. The original 1997 assessment of PacifiCorp's property was 
appealed, but that appeal was subsequently withdrawn and the assessed value became 
final and no longer subject to review. The Commission's decision to review the 1997 
original assessment through its creation of a "threshold inquiry" ignores the statutory bar 
to such a review.10 
Not only is there no statutory basis for this threshold inquiry, but the effect of the 
inquiry is to prevent the Commission from performing its statutorily mandated duty to 
10
 If this court finds that the Commission is authorized to ignore the limitations 
period and reopen the 1997 assessment to determine whether it undervalued PacifiCorp's 
property, it should likewise be authorized to award a refund based on the original 
assessment in the event it concludes the original assessment overvalued PacifiCorp's 
property. PacifiCorp does not believe it is necessary to reopen the 1997 assessment 
because the Division repudiated that assessment when it issued the 2002 escaped property 
assessment. 
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"'determine the fair market value' of PacifiCorp's property in 1997," and "to adopt 
methodologies it determines are necessary to arrive at the fair market value." 
Commission's Brief, pp. 21 and 22. The Commission relies on its "mandate and 
constitutional authority" to determine fair market value as support for the imposition of a 
threshold inquiry. Yet it disregarded those imperatives by refusing to ascertain fair 
market value once it had concluded that the original assessment exceeded fair market 
value. The Commission should not be permitted to create a threshold inquiry which 
allows it to circumvent its constitutionally delegated responsibilities. 
C. The Commission's Scope of Review of an Escaped Property Assessment 
for Undervalued Property Includes the Right to Reduce an Assessment 
to Reflect the Property's Fair Market Value. 
PacifiCorp filed its appeal of the assessment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-2-1007 and 59-1-501 et seq. Section 59-2-1007(7) authorizes the Commission to 
"increase, lower, or sustain [an] assessment" when it finds error in that assessment. 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-502.5(5), which governs petitions for redeterminations 
of deficiencies, permits the Commission to "take any action it deems appropriate to settle, 
compromise, or reduce the deficiency, or adjust the assessed valuation of any property." 
The Commission concedes in it brief that it has the authority to reduce an 
assessment to reflect the fair market value of the assessed property: "[based on the] fair 
market value mandate of the Utah Constitution, Utah statutes, and the Utah Supreme 
Court [the Commission is] required to value property based on fair market value." 
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Commission's Brief, p. 21. Notwithstanding these legal mandates, the Commission has 
fashioned a statutory interpretation which, in this instance, precluded it from arriving at 
fair market value. The Commission's primary justification for its refusal to reduce the 
assessed value of PacifiCorp's property to reflect fair market value is its imposition of the 
"threshold inquiry." PacifiCorp has explained above how the Commission's "threshold 
inquiry" conflicts with Utah law and with the Commission's own characterization of the 
escaped property assessment. Because the escaped property assessment was for property 
which had allegedly been undervalued, it was a complete reassessment of all of 
PacifiCorp's property and was "subject to a full challenge by Petitioner." R. 521 
(March 5, 2003 Order, p. 8). 
The Commission also rejected the refund request on the basis that the limitations 
period for the original assessment has expired. PacifiCorp's appeal does not concern the 
original assessment. Instead it is an appeal of the new, separate assessment which 
reopened the issue of the value of PacifiCorp's property in 1997. Even though PacifiCorp 
paid taxes on the original assessment, when that assessment was repudiated by issuance 
of the new assessment, those taxes were credited toward the liability associated with the 
escaped property assessment. The fact that PacifiCorp did not pay additional taxes when 
it received the new assessment does not foreclose its right to relief. PacifiCorp does not 
seek a refund of taxes it did not pay. It only seeks a refund of the taxes paid on the 
assessed value of PacifiCorp's property which exceeds the property's fair market value. 
20 
Once the Division issued the escaped property assessment, it put the value of all of 
PacifiCorp's property at issue. Having done so, it should never have been permitted to 
restrict the scope of the Commission's inquiry into the fair market value of the property. 
Schneiter Enterprises, Ltd., 899 P.2d at 1230. The Commission's authority to determine 
fair market value and "lower" or "adjust" an assessment necessarily includes the right to 
refund the taxes paid on the assessed value which exceeds the fair market value of the 
property. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S RULING THAT THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD 
APPLICABLE TO ESCAPED PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS HAD 
EXPIRED BEFORE THE DIVISION ISSUED THE ESCAPED PROPERTY 
ASSESSMENT SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED. 
In its reply brief, the Counties, for the first time, contend that the Commission 
erred when it ruled that discovery of the alleged escaped property occurred when the 
escaped property assessment was issued.11 The Counties contend that discovery of the 
11
 In the proceedings below, the Commission specifically rejected the Counties' 
interpretation of the statute of limitations period and held, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, that the five year limitations period applicable to escaped property 
assessments had expired before the Division issued the escaped property assessment. 
When the Counties filed their Docketing Statement they clearly understood that the 
Commission's decision on this issue would be binding if the Counties did not appeal it. 
Therefore, in an effort to preserve the issue, the Counties specifically identified it as 
among those issues it intended to appeal: 
Issue: Did the Commission err in its decisions concerning its interpretation 
of the escaped property statute allowing a five year look-back period, when 
it treated the period as a limitations period running from the date of the 
escaped property assessment instead of a look-back period running from the 
date of discovery, or, alternatively, the date of original assessment? 
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alleged undervaluation occurred when the reporting errors were discovered in July 2000 
and, therefore, the Division was authorized to issue assessments as far back as 1995. The 
Counties also claim that after "discovery" occurs, the "assessment for that five-year 
period could be made 'at any time.'" Counties' Reply Brief, p. 16. 
The Commission rejected this interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-217, 
instead concluding that the five year period was triggered when the assessing authority 
concluded its investigations into the alleged underassessment which, in this case, was 
held to be the time that the escaped property assessment was issued. This is the only 
logical interpretation of the statute. First, even though the Counties and the Division 
were aware of the reporting errors as early as July 2000, the Commission nevertheless 
ordered the Division to "investigate the [Counties'] allegation of escaped property and 
issue an escaped property tax assessment" if it concluded that the property had been 
Counties' Docketing Statement, p. 7. When the Counties failed to address this issue in 
their brief, they waived their right to appeal the Commission's interpretation of the statute 
of limitations for escaped property assessments. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339 
f 17, 79 P.3d 974, 979, American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 
P.2d 1182, 1185, n. 5 (Utah 1996). The Commission, having already filed its response to 
both the Counties' appeal and PacifiCorp's cross-appeal, has no further right to file a 
pleading and is, therefore, deprived of the right to defend its own decision. PacifiCorp 
has this final briefing opportunity only because it filed a cross-appeal. 
In their effort to preserve this issue, the Counties claim that they are merely 
providing an alternative basis supporting the Commission's denial of PacifiCorp's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. While the Counties would be within their rights to offer an 
alternative basis for tolling, they should not be permitted to raise an entirely new legal 
issue for the Court's consideration. 
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undervalued in 1997. Counties Brief, Appendix 2, p. 6 (April 4, 2002 Order). There 
would have been no need to order an investigation if the awareness of reporting errors 
constituted "discovery"of the alleged undervaluation. Second, the Counties9 
interpretation of the statute of limitations is not logical. The Counties claim that so long 
as they can prove that the Division knew or "'through reasonable investigation,... could 
have determined that there was reason to believe' that escaped property existed," the 
reassessment of that property could occur '"at any time'" in the future. Counties' Reply 
Brief, p. 18. Therefore, not only do the Counties allege that knowledge of an 
undervaluation is not even required (if a reasonable investigation would have revealed the 
information), but the Counties also allege that the Division has an infinite period of time 
within which to issue the assessment. This interpretation defies logic. The Commission's 
decision that the Division must conduct a proper investigation of value in order for 
"discovery" to occur is the only logical interpretation of this statute. This conclusion is 
also consistent with the approach taken by the assessing authority in Action TV v. County 
Bd. Of Equal., 1999 UT App 231, 986 P.2d 108 (county determined that personal 
property had escaped taxation for a period of fourteen years, but escaped property 
assessment issued by county was only for period of five years). 
The Counties challenge the Commission's ruling that discovery occurs when the 
escaped property assessment is issued on the basis that it renders the phrase "at any time" 
meaningless. The phrase "at any time" simply means that the assessing authority is not 
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bound by the assessing calendar applicable to typical annual assessments. Statutory 
provisions immediately preceding the escaped property provision establish a calendar 
with which the Commission must comply in its issuance of property tax assessments. 
Section 59-2-201 requires assessments by the Commission to be completed "[b]y May 1 
of each year." Subsequent provisions establish deadlines for centrally assessed taxpayers 
to provide the requisite statements and information to the Commission (usually by 
March 1), Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-202 and 207. Section 59-2-217 creates an exception 
to that calendar by permitting the assessing authority to issue the escaped property 
assessment "at any time" during the calendar year. The phrase "as far back as five years 
prior to the time of discovery" operates as a restriction on the phrase "at any time." In 
other words, an assessing authority may issue an escaped property assessment "at any 
time" so long as the assessment is made within the five years immediately following the 
original assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Commission was correct in its interpretation of when the limitations 
period began to run, the Commission erred when it tolled the statute of limitations for the 
escaped property assessment and its decision on this issue should be reversed.12 Not only 
12
 The Counties rely heavily on Young v. United States. 535 U.S. 43 (2002), in 
support of their argument that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. In 
Young the taxpayer had filed a bankruptcy petition thereby erecting an automatic stay 
during which the IFLS was not able to collect delinquent taxes. The Court tolled the 
limitations period because the taxpayer's actions had actively prevented the IRS from 
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did the Commission disregard the universally applied discovery rule, but its finding of 
exceptional circumstances is not supported by the established facts of this case. This 
Court's reversal of the Commission on that point will render all remaining issues moot. 
Alternatively, if the Court concludes that the Commission can equitably toll the 
five-year limitations period and proceed to the other issues, PacifiCorp respectfully 
requests that the Court reject the Commission's conclusion limiting relief to an abatement 
of the escaped properly assessment and remand the issue to the Commission to enter an 
order setting the fair market value of PacifiCorp's property at such amount below the 
original assessment as may be determined through subsequent proceedings at the 
Commission and issue a refund of any excess property tax that may have been paid. 
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pursuing its claim during that three-year period. PacifiCorp has never impeded the 
Division's ability to issue a timely escaped property assessment. Thus, regardless of 
whether the five year period is a statute of limitations or a "look-back" period, as alleged 
by the Counties, tolling is not appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
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